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Summary
This paper develops a model of a professional sports league with network externalities by
integrating the theory of two-sided markets into a two-stage contest model. In professional
team sports, the competition of the clubs functions as a platform that enables sponsors to inter-
act with fans. In these club-mediated interactions, positive network effects operate from the fan
market to the sponsor market, while positive or negative network effects operate from the
sponsor market to the fan market. We show that the size of these network effects determines
the level of competitive balance within the league. If the market potential of the sponsors is
small (large), competitive balance increases (decreases) with stronger combined network ef-
fects. We further deduce that clubs benefit from stronger combined network effects through
higher profits and that network externalities can mitigate the negative effect of revenue sharing
on competitive balance. Finally, we derive implications for improving competitive balance by
taking advantage of network externalities. For example, our model suggests that an increase in
the market potential of sponsors produces a more balanced league.
1 Introduction
The professional team sports industry has a unique organizational structure. It is the
only industry in which production is organized by leagues. This unique organizational
structure is the result of the industry-specific production and competition process. In-
dustry outsiders often tend to regard individual teams as firms and treat them as pro-
duction units. Unlike an automobile firm, however, an individual team cannot produce a
marketable product. Each team needs at least one opponent to play a match. However,
even a match between two teams is not an attractive product. The individual matches
must be upgraded by integrating them into an organized championship race. This up-
grade, which gives each individual match additional value within the larger context of
the championship race, is managed by the league.
* Previous versions of this article were presented at the 86th Annual Conference of the Western
Economic Association in San Diego, the 2nd European Conference in Sport Economics in Cologne,
Germany and the 10th Annual Meeting of the European Academy of Management (EURAM) in
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From a sports perspective, each team within a league wants to win as many games as
possible. Economically, however, teams are not so much competitors but are rather com-
plementors. The quality or economic value of the championship race depends to a large
extent on the level of competitive balance. Unlike Toyota and Ford, which prefer weak
competitors in their industry, sports teams like Real Madrid, the New York Yankees, and
the Dallas Cowboys benefit from having strong opponents within their leagues. A more
balanced league usually produces a more attractive – that is, economically more valuable
– product.1
The clubs’ competition provides the platform for the interaction of various market sides
such as fans, advertisers and sponsors, the media, and merchandising companies. These
interactions via an intermediary platform creates what is called a “multisided market.”
Each of the distinct market sides demands a specific good or service provided by the
intermediary. Frequently, the market sides do not interact with each other directly; how-
ever, they exert network externalities on each other. These externalities influence the
market’s demand structure and the intermediary’s pricing schemes.
Fans demand competition and the experience of a sports event, advertisers and sponsors
demand an audience that they can inform about their products or services, the media
demand an audience willing to pay for the use of their services, merchandising companies
demand customers who want to buy their articles, etc. An interaction between two mar-
ket sides only takes place because of the underlying sports event. Fans would hardly con-
sume advertisement content if there were not a match taking place that featured their
favorite team. Merchandising companies would sell many fewer fan articles if their pro-
ducts were not linked to an active sports team, and so on. These examples underline the
importance of the clubs’ competition to act as a platform for the different market sides
that interact and exert network externalities on each other.
We add to the literature by contributing to two different strands of literature: on the one
hand, the literature on multisided markets and on the other hand, the literature on ana-
lytical models of sports leagues. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to integrate
the theory of two-sided markets into a contest model of a professional team sports lea-
gue.2 Our model can then be used as a basic framework to analyze the effect of different
cross-subsidization schemes in team sports leagues.
In particular, this paper develops a model of a professional sports league with network
externalities by integrating the theory of two-sided markets into a two-stage contest
model. In professional team sports, the competition of the clubs functions as a platform
that enables sponsors to interact with fans. In these club-mediated interactions, positive
network effects operate from the fan market to the sponsor market, while positive or
1 According to the so-called “uncertainty of outcome” hypothesis (Rottenberg 1956), fans prefer to
attend games with an uncertain outcome and enjoy close championship races. For empirical con-
tributions that analyze the relation between competitive balance and match attendance, see Down-
ward and Dawson (2000), Borland and MacDonald (2003) and Szymanski (2003).
2 Notable exemptions include Bae and Kwon (2008) and Budzinski and Satzer (2010). Bae and Kwon
(2008) present an analytical model in which teams in a sports leagues compete for players and fans.
In their framework, two-sided network effects are important because a club with a larger portion of
talented players attracts more fans and, simultaneously, players want to play for a large-market
club. However, they do not explicitly model the competition of the clubs via contest theory. Bud-
zinski and Satzer (2010) develop a conceptual framework by describing the platform elements of
professional suppliers of sports events.
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negative network effects operate from the sponsor market to the fan market.3 In line with
standard results in the literature on two-sided markets (Armstrong 2006; Kaiser/Wright
2006; Rochet/Tirole 2006), we derive that clubs react to stronger fan-related network
externalities by charging lower prices to fans and higher prices to sponsors. The opposite
holds true for weaker negative or stronger positive sponsor-related network external-
ities. New and potentially important for professional sports, our analysis further shows
that the size of these network externalities determines the level of competitive balance
within the league. Depending on the market potential of the sponsors, competitive ba-
lance increases (small market potential) or decreases (large market potential) with stron-
ger combined network effects. Moreover, we show that clubs benefit from the presence of
network externalities because club profits increase with stronger combined network ef-
fects. The paper can be of interest to policy-makers in a professional team sports league
because we derive recommendations of how to improve competitive balance by taking
advantage of network externalities. Our model suggests that an increase in the market
potential of sponsors produces a more balanced league because the small club will in-
crease its talent investments more than the large club in equilibrium. Finally, we show
that network externalities can mitigate the negative effect of revenue sharing on com-
petitive balance.
Taking a closer look at major team sports leagues worldwide, one can find a number of
phenomena that may be explained by our model. For example, the differences in match
attendance and average ticket prices between national leagues in European football are
accompanied by strong divergences in sponsor-related revenues. While match-day in-
come (e. g., ticket sales and others) in the 2008/2009 season with Q665m was higher
in the English Premier League than in the German Bundesliga, where it amounted to
Q363m, a look at commercial revenue (e. g., sponsorship and others) yields the opposite
picture, there, the Premier League generated Q527m and the Bundesliga Q723m (see
Deloitte & Touche 2010). This observation provides anecdotal evidence for our theo-
retical model and mirrors the trade-off between fan-related and sponsor-related re-
venues. The quota for sponsorship in many North American major leagues represents
another example; even though teams might be able to obtain higher revenues by in-
creasing the amount of sponsoring/advertisements, the majority of teams refrains
from posting advertisements on jerseys.4
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. In Section 3,
we present our model with its notation and main assumptions. We specify fan and spon-
sor demand, the quality of the competition and club profits. In Section 4, we solve the
two-stage game, derive the subgame-perfect equilibria and discuss the results. Section 5
highlights policy implications regarding competitive balance and revenue sharing. Final-
ly, Section 6 points out possible extensions and concludes the paper.
2 Literature review
Economists have designed various models of sports leagues. In an early contribution,
El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971) developed a dynamic decision-making model of a profes-
3 See Becker and Murphy (1993) for a discussion on advertisements as a good or bad. For further
analysis of advertisements see, e. g., Depken and Wilson (2004) and Reisinger et al. (2009).
4 Note that teams in the National Football League (NFL) are allowed to post a sponsor on their jer-
seys. Only a small proportion of teams, however, makes use of this opportunity.
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sional sports league and incorporated certain fundamental features of the North Amer-
ican sports industry such as the reserve clause, player drafts and the sale of player con-
tracts among teams. They show that revenue sharing does not influence competitive ba-
lance and thus confirm the “invariance proposition”.5 Fort and Quirk (1995) derive si-
milar results in an updated, static version of the El-Hodiri and Quirk model. Atkinson rt
al. (1988) contradict the invariance proposition and show that revenue sharing can im-
prove competitive balance. In their model, Atkinson et al. adopt a pool-sharing arran-
gement and a club revenue function that depends on the team’s performance and on the
performance of all other teams. Their result is supported by Marburger (1997), who
builds his model on the assumption that fans care about the relative and absolute quality
of teams. Vrooman (1995) shows that sharing the winning-elastic revenue does not affect
competitive balance, while sharing the winning-inelastic revenue does improve compe-
titive balance. Ke´senne (2000a) develops a two-team model consisting of a large- and a
small-market club and shows that a payroll cap, defined as a fixed percentage of league
revenue divided by the number of teams, will improve competitive balance as well as the
distribution of player salary within the league (Ke´senne 2007).
The recent sports economics literature has suggested modeling a team sports league by
making use of contest theory.6 In his seminal article, Szymanski (2003) applied Tullock’s
(1980) rent-seeking contest to ascertain the optimal design of sports leagues. Based on a
model of two profit-maximizing clubs and a club revenue function that depends on the
relative quality of the home team, Szymanski and Ke´senne (2004) show that gate revenue
sharing decreases competitive balance. This result is driven by the so-called “dulling ef-
fect.” The dulling effect describes the well-known fact in sports economics that revenue
sharing reduces the incentive to invest in playing talent. Dietl and Lang (2008) confirm
this finding and further show that gate revenue sharing increases social welfare.
As this brief review of the sports economics literature shows, analytical models in sports
are mainly focused on the effect of cross-subsidization schemes such as reserve clauses,
revenue sharing and salary caps on competitive balance without taking into account that
the competition of the clubs provides the platform for the interaction of various market
sides (fans, sponsors, advertisers and the media). These club-mediated interactions of
different market sides create a “multisided market.”
Research related to multisided markets is flourishing and has been conducted on a broad
range of topics and industries: e. g., software platforms (Evans et al. 2004), payment
systems (Rochet/Tirole 2002; Schmalensee 2002; Wright 2003, 2004), the Internet
(Baye/Morgan 2001; Caillaud/Jullien 2003) and media markets (Kaiser/Wright 2006;
Crampes et al. 2009; Reisinger et al. 2009). More general models have been proposed
by Rochet and Tirole (2003b), Armstrong (2006), Armstrong and Wright (2007) and
Belleflamme and Toulemonde (2009). The analysis of two-sided markets draws on
the literature on network externalities and multi-product pricing (Rochet/Tirole
2006). Pricing decisions account for originally non-internalized externalities among
the market sides. For example, the market side that exerts larger positive externalities
on the other market side is subsidized via a lower price (see Armstrong 2006; Kaiser/
5 The “invariance proposition” goes back to Rottenberg (1956) and states that the distribution of
playing talent between clubs in professional sports leagues does not depend on the allocation of
property rights to players’ services. See also Vrooman (1996).
6 The first approaches in contest theory were made by Lazear and Rosen (1981), Green and Stokey
(1983) and Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983).
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Wright 2006). Apart from implications for agent behavior in two-sided markets and
optimum pricing decisions, research also has established important implications for eco-
nomic policy. It has been shown that measures which are conducive in traditional mar-
kets may be ineffective or negative in two-sided markets (Wright 2004; Evans/Schma-
lensee 2005). For example, two-sided markets may show price structures that do not
reflect a meaningful economic relationship between prices and costs on either side of
the market considered by itself, which matters for antitrust analysis (Evans 2003;
Rochet/Tirole 2003). Despite the large variety of applications, the theory of multisided
markets has not yet been applied to contest models of professional sports leagues. Our
paper tries to fill the gaps in the literature on sports economics andmultisidedmarkets by
developing a simple contest model of a professional team sports league with two market
sides and network externalities.
3 Model setup
We model a professional team sports league with two clubs, denoted as 1 and 2. The
clubs are asymmetric with respect to their market size – that is, there is one large-market
club and one small-market club. Each club i 2 f1; 2g invests independently a certain
amount xi  0 in playing talent to maximize its profits.7 Talent is measured in perfectly
divisible units that can be hired at a competitive labor market.
In our model, the competition of the clubs provides the platform that serves as the inter-
mediary between two groups: fans and sponsors. Fans can consume sports competition
by watching a match, while sponsors are attracted to the competition because sports
events draw large crowds of potential customers and help to build a positive corporate
image. The size of the crowd can then be leveraged through media coverage – an effect
that we model indirectly. The attractiveness of a sports event for sponsors increases with
the number of fans watching. The presence of sponsors, in turn, may have a negative
effect on the attractiveness of the event for the fans. These indirect effects are modeled
as network externalities in the sponsor and fan demand functions.
The timing of the model features a two-stage structure:
1. Stage: Clubs invest independently in playing talent with the objective of maximizing
their own profits. Talent investments determine the win percentages and thus the qual-
ity of the competition of the two clubs.
2. Stage: Given a certain quality of competition, clubs charge prices for fans and sponsors
taking into account the network externalities that operate from one market side to the
other. Next, fans and sponsors make their decisions and each club then generates its
own revenues dependent on the decisions of fans and sponsors.
In the sections that follow, we derive the demand functions of fans and sponsors under
network externalities and specify the quality of the competition. Finally, we derive club
revenues, costs and profits.
3.1 Demand of fans and sponsors under network externalities
Following the literature on two-sidedmarkets (e. g., Armstrong 2006), the linear demand
functions are defined as follows. We assume that the fans of club i demand the quantity
qfi  0 given by
7 If not otherwise stated, henceforth i; j 2 f1; 2g; with i 6¼ j.
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qfi ¼ mfi 
pfi
hi
þ nsqsi ; ð1Þ
while the amount of advertising qsi  0 that sponsors place at club i is given by8
qsi ¼ ms 
psi
hi
þ nf qfi ; ð2Þ
with prices pfi  0; psi  0, quality of the competition hi > 0; market sizes mfi > 0;
ms > 0, and network effects nf 2 ½0; 1Þ, ns 2 ð1; 1Þ.
The price fans have to pay to be able to watch a match, is denoted by pfi , while p
s
i stands
for the price sponsors have to pay for advertisements. Clubs can charge fans for watching
the match by selling tickets and also, indirectly, by collectively or individually selling
media rights. Through ticket sales, clubs directly generate revenues from fan attendance.
Through media rights sales, clubs indirectly generate revenues from fans by the sale of
the rights to a broadcasting company, which in turn charges its viewers for the broad-
cast.9
The parameter mfi characterizes the market size of club i. We assume that club 1 is the
large club, with a higher drawing potential, and as a result, a bigger fan base than the
small club 2, such that mf1 > m
f
2. Furthermore, the parameter m
srepresents the total
market potential of the sponsors, or, in the case of a binding quota for sponsoring defined
by the league, the sponsors’ bounded market potential.10
The network externalities that operate from the fan market to the sponsor market are
referred to as “fan-related network externalities” and are denoted by nf 2 ½0; 1Þ. We as-
sume that the fan-related network externalities are positive because more fans imply
more publicity and thus have a positive effect on the demand in the sponsor market.
On the other hand, the network externalities that operate from the sponsor market
to the fan market are referred to as “sponsor-related network externalities” and are de-
noted by ns 2 ð1; 1Þ. Thus, we allow for positive or negative sponsor-related network
externalities. However, we assume that the positive fan-related network externalities are
at least as strong as the sponsor-related network externalities in absolute values, i. e.,
nf  nsj j. The possibly positive (even though small) effect of advertising on consumers
(see, e. g., Nelson 1974 and Kotowitz/Mathewson 1979) reduces the negative sponsor-
related network externalities such that the assumption nf  nsj j is reasonable.11
8 For the sake of completeness, we define the demand function of the sponsors qsi to be zero in the case
that there are no fans, i. e., qfi ¼ 0. However, note that qfi ¼ 0 will never be an equilibrium outcome.
9 In a first approach, our model includes the media indirectly as a lever for higher fan attendance. In
further research, the media sector could be modeled as a third market side.
10 Note that the parameterms has no subscript, because we assume that there is only one homogeneous
group of sponsors in the league offering advertisements to the two types of clubs. The introduction
of a club-specific sponsor with market potential msi at club i would not change the results qualita-
tively.
11 A potentially negative externality derived from advertisements could be that fans want to watch
sports events, not advertisements. In the case where the actual sports event is adapted to commercial
requirements, e. g., special advertisement breaks, this aspect becomes even more obvious. For
further discussion of this aspect, see Becker and Murphy (1993), Depken and Wilson (2004)
and Reisinger et al. (2009).
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In general, network externalities can be illustrated by a displacement of the demand
functions qfi and q
s
i . In this respect, stronger network externalities induce stronger dis-
placement of the corresponding demand functions. The combined network effects from
fans and sponsors, denoted by g are given by g 	 nf þ ns. A higher nf implies that the
positive fan-related network externalities are relatively more important than the spon-
sor-related network externalities, such that the combined network effects increase. Si-
milarly, a higher ns (i. e., either weaker negative or stronger positive sponsor-related net-
work externalities) results in stronger combined network effects. By assuming that
nf  nsj j the combined network effects g are not smaller than zero - i. e., g 2 ½0; 2Þ. Con-
sequently, g > 0 describes a situation with positive combined network effects in which
the positive fan-related network externalities are stronger than the sponsor-related net-
work externalities in absolute values. If g ¼ 0 then the combined network effects equal
zero. In this case, we have either a situation without network externalities (i. e.,
nf ¼ ns ¼ 0) or a situation with equalized network externalities in which both individual
network externalities are equal in terms of absolute values (i. e., nf ¼ ns).
Finally, the parameter hidenotes the quality of the competition between club i against
club j and is specified below by equation (5). We assume that a higher quality of the
the event (competition of the clubs) has a positive effect on fan demand, but at the
same time, it has also a positive impact on sponsor demand (i. e., qqsi=qhi ¼
psi=h
2
i þ nf ðqqfi =qhiÞ > 0): there is a positive effect qqfi =qhi > 0 through more fans and
a positive leverage effect psi=h
2
i > 0, because a high quality event draws a larger audience.
The media serve as an additional lever, increasing sponsors’ exposure to consumers.12
Consequently, sponsors’ demand increases through a higher quality via more media
exposure (Borland/MacDonald 2003 and Farrelly/Quester 2003).
3.2 The quality of the competition
We assume that the quality of the competition hi depends on two factors: the probability
of club i’s success and the uncertainty of outcome. Following Dietl et al. (2009) and Lang
et al. (2011), we further assume that both factors enter the quality function as a sum with
equal weights.13
We measure the probability of club i’s success by the win percentage wi of this club. The
win percentage, in turn, is characterized by the contest-success function (CSF), which
maps the vector ðxi; xjÞ of talent investment into probabilities for each club. We apply
the Tullock CSF, which is the most widely used functional form of a CSF in sporting
contests, and we thus define the win percentage wi of club i as
14
wiðxi;xjÞ ¼ xi
xi þ xj ; ð3Þ
12 According to Grohs et al. (2004) sponsors aim to maximize their media presence and connect the
image of their products to the image of the sports club brand in order to increase the demand for
their goods and services.
13 We will see below that this specification of the quality function gives rise to a quadratic revenue
function widely used in the sports economic literature.
14 This logit CSF for imperfectly discriminating contests was generally introduced by Tullock (1980)
and it was subsequently axiomatized by Skaperdas (1996) and Clark and Riis (1998). An alternative
functional form would be the probit CSF (Lazear/Rosen 1981; Dixit 1987), the difference-form CSF
(Hirshleifer 1989) and the value weighted CSF (Runkel 2006). See Dietl et al. (2008) and Fort and
Winfree (2009) for studies concerning the effect of the discriminatory power in the CSF.
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where xi  0 characterizes the talent investments of club i. We define wiðxi; xjÞ :¼ 1=2 if
xi ¼ xj ¼ 0. Given that the win percentages must sum up to unity, we obtain the adding-
up constraint: wj ¼ 1wi. Following Szymanski (2004), we adopt the “Contest-Nash
conjectures” and compute the derivative of equation (3) as qwi=qxi ¼ xj=ðxi þ xjÞ2.
The uncertainty of outcome is measured by the competitive balance in the league. Fol-
lowing Szymanski (2003), Dietl and Lang (2008), and Vrooman (2008), we specify
competitive balance CB by the product of the win percentages, i. e.,
CBðxi; xjÞ ¼ wiðxi;xjÞ wjðxi; xjÞ ¼ xixjðxi þ xjÞ2
: ð4Þ
Note that competitive balance attains its maximum of 1=4 for a completely balanced
league in which both clubs invest the same amount in talent such that
w1 ¼ w2 ¼ 1=2. A less balanced league is then characterized by a lower value of CB.
With the specification of the win percentage given by equation (3) and competitive ba-
lance given by equation (4), club i’s quality function hi as described above is derived as15
hiðxi; xjÞ ¼ wiðxi;xjÞ þwiðxi; xjÞ 1wiðxi;xjÞ
  ¼ xiðxi þ 2xjÞðxi þ xjÞ2 : ð5Þ
A higher win percentagewi of club i increases the quality of the competition hi, albeit at a
decreasing rate, which reflects the impact of competitive balance on the quality of the
competition, i. e., qhi=qwi > 0 and q
2hi=qw2i < 0.
16
3.3 Derivation of club revenues, costs and profits
Each club generates its own revenues such that total revenue Ri of club i is given by the
sum of fan-related revenue pfi q
f
i and sponsor-related revenue p
s
iq
s
i :
Ri ¼ pfi qfi þ psi qsi ¼ mfi  qfi þ nsqsi
 
qfi þ ms  qsi þ nf qfi
 
qsi
h i
 hi; ð6Þ
with hi ¼ 2wiðxi; xjÞ wiðxi; xjÞ2. This club-specific revenue function, which is quadratic
in the win percentage, is widely used in the sports economics literature. For instance, our
revenue is consistent with the revenue functions used in Szymanski (2003: 1164). More-
over, note that club i’s revenues increase with the quality of the competition hi.
By assuming a competitive labor market and following the sports economic literature,
the market clearing cost of a unit of talent, denoted by c, is the same for every club. The
cost function of club i is thus given by CðxiÞ ¼ cxi, where c is the marginal unit cost
of talent.
15 An alternative would be to specify quality as hi ¼ lwi þwið1wiÞ where l > 0 could allow the
relative importance of the two components of the quality function to shift. A low l would char-
acterize a situation where fans have a high preference for competitive balance and a low preference
for own team winning. However, this specification qualitatively yields the same results but would
make the notation and calculations significantly more complicated without adding any new in-
sights.
16 For studies of competitive balance in sports leagues, see, e. g., Fort and Lee (2007) and Fort and
Quirk (2011).
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The profit function of club i is then given by revenues minus costs and yields
piðxi;xjÞ ¼ Riðwiðxi; xjÞÞ  CðxiÞ: ð7Þ
4 Equilibrium analysis
In the first stage, clubs decide on their investments in playing talent, considering the cost
of talent and its effect on their win percentage. In the second stage, given the quality of
the competition as determined in stage 1, clubs charge prices for fans and sponsors taking
into account the network externalities. Then, fans and sponsors make their decisions.We
apply backward induction to solve for the subgame-perfect equilibria in this two-stage
game.
4.1 Stage 2
In this subsection, we characterize the point at which the pricing for fans and sponsors
under network externalities is optimal such that clubs obtain maximum revenue. Clubs
will take into account the relatedness of the fan and sponsor market and thus consider
the consequences of the two distinct network externalities on the pricing decisions and
demand functions. Formally, club i ¼ f1; 2g maximizes its revenue Ri ¼ pfi qfi þ psi qsi in
stage 2 by taking the investment decisions made in stage 1 as given. The equilibrium in
prices and quantities in stage 2 is derived in the next lemma.
Lemma 1
In stage 2, equilibrium prices and quantities for fans and sponsors of club i are given by
ðbpfi ; bqfi Þ ¼ mfi 2 nf g	 
þmsðns  nf Þ2 gð Þ 2þ gð Þ hi; 2m
f
i þmsg
2 gð Þ 2þ gð Þ
 !
; ð8Þ
bpsi ; bqsi	 
 ¼ mfi ðnf  nsÞ þms 2 nsgð Þ2 gð Þ 2þ gð Þ hi; m
f
i gþ 2ms
2 gð Þ 2þ gð Þ
 !
: ð9Þ
Proof. See Appendix A1.
In equilibrium, fans will demand the quantity represented by bqfi and are willing to pay
the price represented by bpfi . Correspondingly, the sponsors will demand bqsi and pay bpsi for
each unit of advertisement in equilibrium.17 In the next lemma, we derive how equili-
brium quantities and prices react to changes in the network externalities.
Lemma 2
(i) Equilibrium quantities for fans and sponsors of club i increase with nf and ns, i. e.,
qbqli =qnf > 0 and qbqli =qns > 0 for l 2 ff ; sg.
(ii) Given a certain quality of the competition hi, equilibrium prices for fans (sponsors)
of club i decrease (increase) with stronger fan-related network externalities: i. e.,
qbpfi =qnf < 0ðqbpsi=qnf > 0). The opposite holds true for weaker negative or stronger
positive sponsor-related network externalities on the prices for fans (sponsors): i. e.,
qbpfi =qns > 0 (qbpsi=qns < 0).
Proof. See Appendix A2.
17 Note that if the market potential of the sponsors is larger than that of the fans of club i, i. e.,ms > mfi ,
we must bound ms from above such that ms < ms 	 m
f
i
2nf gð Þ
nfns in order to guarantee that bpfi > 0.
344 . Helmut Dietl, Tobias Duschl, Egon Franck, and Markus Lang
In line with well-established results from the literature on two-sided markets (Armstrong
2006; Kaiser/Wright 2006; Rochet/Tirole 2006), Part (i) of the lemma shows that the
stronger are the positive fan-related network externalities nf , the higher is the equili-
brium quantity demanded by fans and sponsors. If there is a disutility of the sponsors’
advertisements for fans (ns < 0), then the equilibrium quantities demanded by fans and
sponsors decrease with stronger, i. e., more negative sponsor-related network external-
ities. If, on the other hand, ns > 0, then the equilibrium quantities demanded by fans and
sponsors increase with stronger, i. e., more positive sponsor-related network external-
ities. It follows that the equilibrium demands bqsi and bqfi are higher in a situation in which
the combined network effects are positive than in a situation in which the combined
network effects are zero. Ceteris paribus, an increase in ns (i. e., either weaker negative
or stronger positive sponsor-related network externalities) yields increased combined
network effects and thus leads to an increase in the demand of fans. In combination
with the positive fan-related network externalities, this induces an increase in demand
on the part of sponsors.
Part (ii) of the lemma is also in line with the literature on two-sided markets and shows
that given a certain quality of the competition hi, the equilibrium price bpfi for the fans of
club i is lower and the equilibrium price bpsi for the sponsors is higher, the stronger are
the positive fan-related network externalities nf . Relatively stronger fan-related network
externalities induce an increase in the demand function of the sponsors and yield, ceteris
paribus, an increase in the prices for sponsors. The opposite holds true for weaker
negative or stronger positive sponsor-related network externalities. Hence, if club i
decreases the price for the market with the stronger positive network externalities
(in our model the fan market), it enhances the positive effect on revenues (Armstrong
2006).
It follows that due to the positive network externalities exerted by the fans on the spon-
sors, a revenue-maximizing club has an incentive to keep prices low on the market with
the positive network externalities (fan market), whereas in the market with relatively
weaker positive or even negative network externalities (sponsor market), it has an in-
centive to charge higher prices. We derive that equilibrium prices for fans (sponsors)
are lower (higher) in a situation with positive combined network effects than in a situa-
tion in which combined network effects equal zero.
By substituting equilibrium prices and quantities of fans and sponsors from (8) and (9) in
the revenue function (6), we compute the revenue of club i as18
bRi ¼ ji  hi ¼ ji xiðxi þ 2xjÞðxi þ xjÞ2 ; ð10Þ
with
ji 	 ðm
f
i Þ2 þ msð Þ2þmfi msg
2 gð Þ 2þ gð Þ : ð11Þ
In the next lemma, we derive some useful properties of the sponsor- and fan-related rev-
enue function ji, which will be exploited in the subsequent analysis.
18 The revenue function given by (10) satisfies the properties of the revenue function proposed by
Szymanski and Ke´senne (2004: 168).
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Lemma 3
We consider jiðgÞ as a function of the combined network externalities g and derive the
following properties: j1ðgÞ > j2ðgÞ and qj1ðgÞ=qg > qj2ðgÞ=qg > 0.
Proof. Straightforward and therefore omitted.
It follows from Lemma 3 that given a certain quality of competition equal for both clubs
(i. e., h1 ¼ h2), the sponsor- and fan-related revenue of the large club will be higher than
the revenue of the small club.Moreover, sponsor- and fan-related revenues for both types
of clubs increase with stronger combined network effects, where the increase is stronger
for the large club than for the small club.
4.2 Stage 1
In stage 1, club i maximizes its profits by anticipating the decisions made in stage 2. By
substituting club revenues (10) into the profit function (7), we derive the maximization
problem of club i in stage 1 as
max
xi0
pi ¼ bRiðxi; xjÞ  cxin o ¼ ðmfi Þ2 þ msð Þ2þmfi msg
2 gð Þ 2þ gð Þ
 !
xiðxi þ 2xjÞ
ðxi þ xjÞ2
 cxi: ð12Þ
The first-order conditions for this maximization problem yield19
qpi
qxi
¼ ðm
f
i Þ2 þ msð Þ2þmfi msg
2 gð Þ 2þ gð Þ
 !
2x2j
ðxi þ xjÞ3
 c ¼ 0:
Solving this system of equations, yields the equilibrium talent investments of club i in
stage 1 as
bxi ¼ 2jijj jiðji þ 3jjÞ  ðjijjÞ1=2ð3ji þ jjÞ
h i
cðji  jjÞ3
: ð13Þ
Both types of clubs invest a positive amount bxi > 0 in playing talent. Moreover, the large
club invests more in talent than the small club (i. e., bx1 > bx2) because the marginal rev-
enue of talent investments is higher for the former type of club due to the larger market
potential of its fans.20 Note that the investments of both clubs are influenced by the net-
work externalities exerted by fans and sponsors. Again, the extent to which fans and
sponsors indirectly influence each other determines the decision of each club to invest
in playing talent.
Substituting the equilibrium investments (13) into the CSF (3) yields the following equi-
librium win percentages:
ðbw1; bw2Þ ¼ j1
j1 þ ðj1j2Þ1=2
;
j2
j2 þ ðj1j2Þ1=2
 !
: ð14Þ
By analyzing the impact of network externalities on the win percentages, we can estab-
lish the following proposition.
19 It is easy to verify that the second-order conditions for a maximum are satisfied.
20 See Buraimo et al. (2007), who analyze how playing success is linked to market size in practice.
346 . Helmut Dietl, Tobias Duschl, Egon Franck, and Markus Lang
Proposition 1
Stronger combined network effects g induce the large (small) club to decrease
(increase) its win percentage in equilibrium and thus produce a more balanced league
if and only if the market potential of the sponsors is sufficiently small. Formally,
qbw1=qg < 0 and qbw2=qg > 0, ms < bms 	 ðmf1mf2Þ1=2:
Proof. See Appendix A3.
The proposition shows that with a sufficiently small market potential of the sponsors,
i. e., ms < bms, the win percentage of the large (small) club decreases (increases) with
stronger positive fan-related network externalities. Weaker negative or stronger positive
sponsor-related network externalities yield the same result. The intuition behind this
result is as follows. Stronger combined network effects have a positive impact on margin-
al revenue of both clubs such that both clubs will increase their investment levels. To
determine which club increases its investments more strongly, we have to analyze the
relationship between fans’ market sizes and the sponsor’s market potential. The differ-
ence in market sizes for the two clubs regarding their fan base yields that sponsor-related
revenues are relatively more important to the small club than to the large club. It follows
that the marginal impact on club revenues of stronger combined network effects is
greater for the small club than for the large club.
As a result, the small club increases its investment in talent stronger than the large club as
combined network effects increase. For the large club, the opposite rationale holds. In
equilibrium, the large club increases its investment level less strongly than the small club,
thereby decreasing its win percentage. Consequently, with stronger combined network
externalities competitive balance increases. Thus, a league in which the positive fan-re-
lated network externalities are stronger than the sponsor-related network externalities
(in absolute value) may be characterized by a higher degree of competitive balance than a
league in which combined network effects are zero. For a sufficiently large market
potential of the sponsors, i. e.,ms > bms, the opposite holds true. In this case, competitive
balance decreases if combined network effects increase.
Furthermore, note that the quality of the competition bhi in equilibrium can be expressed
in terms of ji as
bhi ¼ bwi þ bwi bwj ¼ jið2jj þ ðjijjÞ1=2Þðji þ ðjijjÞ1=2Þðjj þ ðjijjÞ1=2Þ :
We derive that stronger combined network effects imply a lower (higher) quality of com-
petition for the large (small) club if and only if the market potential of the sponsors is
sufficiently small. Formally, ðqbh1=qg < 0 and qbh2=qg > 0Þ , ms < bms. Because the qual-
ity function for club i is an increasing function in the win percentagewi, the intuition is as
follows. As we know from Proposition 1, a more balanced (unbalanced) league emerges
in the case of sufficiently low (high) market potential on the part of the sponsors yielding
a lower (higher) win percentage of the large club and a higher (lower) win percentage for
the small club. It follows that the quality of competition for the large club decreases,
while it increases for the small club if and only if ms < bms.
Substituting the equilibrium investments (13) in the profit function (7) yields the follow-
ing equilibrium profits of club i
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bpi ¼ j2i ji 2jj þ ðjijjÞ1=2
 
 3jjðjijjÞ1=2
h i
ðji  jjÞ ji þ ðjijjÞ1=2
 
jj þ ðjijjÞ1=2
  :
The impact of network externalities on club profits is established in the following pro-
position.
Proposition 2
Stronger combined network effects yield an increase in profits for the small and the large
club.
Proof. See Appendix A4.
The proposition shows that the profits of the small and the large club increase if the
positive network externalities that operate from the fan market to the sponsor market
increase (or equivalently, through a weaker impact by sponsors’ advertisements on the
fans). Thus, the two types of clubs benefit from stronger network effects. To see the
intuition behind this result, remember that the profits of club i in equilibrium are given
by bpi ¼ jibhi  cbxi, and hence, the partial derivatives with respect to combined network
effects g yield qbpi=qg ¼ ðqji=qgÞ  bhi þ ji  ðqbhi=qgÞ  c  ðqbxi=qgÞ.
On the one hand, stronger combined network effects imply a higher investment level in
playing talent such that both types of clubs face higher costs. On the other hand, stronger
combined network effects increase sponsor-related and fan-related revenues ji such that
club revenues for both types of clubs increase. The higher club revenues compensate for
the higher costs, and thus, club profits increase. It should be noted that the positive effect
on club revenues due to stronger combined network effects holds true even though the
quality of the competition bhi will decrease for the large (small) club if the market poten-
tial ms of the sponsors is sufficiently small (large).
5 Further Implications and Discussion
5.1 Competitive balance and network externalities
Research on competitive balance has not considered the influence of network effects so
far, i. e., the parameter g has been assumed to be zero. By integrating the existence of
network effects into models of sports leagues, new policy measures for leagues and their
governing bodies emerge. For example, Proposition 1 suggests that network externalities
positively affect competitive balance when there is a limit on sponsoring activities. In
particular, if sponsors only dispose of a limited quota for advertisements ms < bms, com-
petitive balance increases through stronger network externalities that operate from fans
to sponsors (or equivalently, through a weaker impact by sponsors’ advertisements on
the fans).
The league and its clubs cannot manipulate the strength of the network externalities.
However, by controlling the market potential of the sponsors, they can make sure
that the network externalities operate in the desired direction. The market potential
of the sponsors is thus a crucial parameter to control the competitive balance in our lea-
gue model. This result will be emphasized in the next proposition.
Proposition 3
Competition in the league becomes more balanced if the market potential ms of the
sponsors increases.
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Proof. See Appendix A5.
The proposition shows that a possible measure for improving competitive balance is to
increase the market potential of the sponsors. An increase in the market potential of the
sponsors could be achieved, for instance, through an increase in the quota for the amount
of advertisements set by the league. Under a quota on sponsoring one can imagine re-
strictions on where advertisements may be placed (e. g. jerseys) or on the specific types of
companies that are allowed to appear as sponsors in a league.
The intuition behind the result in Proposition 3 is that clubs generate revenues from fans
and sponsors, where the amount of sponsorship revenues also depends on the amount of
fans affiliated with a certain club (see Lemma 1). In equilibrium, the revenues generated
from the sponsors’ advertisements are higher for the large club than for the small club
due to the larger market potential from the fans of the large club. An increase in the quota
for the amount of advertising for the sponsors increases both clubs’ marginal revenues.
Due to the decreasing returns to scale of sponsors’ advertising, the increase in marginal
revenue, however, is stronger for the small club than for the large club. It follows that the
incentives to invest in playing talent are higher for the small club than for the large club.
This relative difference causes the former type of club to increase its equilibrium talent
investments more than the latter type of club. As a result, the win percentage of the large
(small) club decreases (increases) and a more balanced league emerges.
5.2 Revenue sharing and network externalities
In this section, we analyze the effect of revenue sharing in the presence of network ex-
ternalities. The sharing of revenues plays an important role in the redistribution of rev-
enues and has long been accepted as an exemption from antitrust law.21 The basic idea of
such a cross-subsidization policy is to guarantee a reasonable competitive balance in the
league by redistributing revenues from large clubs to small clubs because large clubs have
a higher revenue-generating potential than do small clubs (Atkinson et al. 1988; Ke´senne
2000a; Szymanski/Ke´senne 2004; Dietl et al. 2011). The current revenue-sharing
schemes vary widely among professional sports leagues. The most prominent is possibly
that operated by the National Football League (NFL), in which the visiting club receives
40 of the locally earned television and gate receipt revenue. Major League Baseball
(MLB) has a revenue-sharing agreement whereby all the clubs in the American League
put 34 of their locally generated revenue (gate, concessions, television, etc.) into a central
pool, which is then divided equally among all the clubs.
We introduce a pool revenue-sharing arrangement into our model. Under a pool-sharing
arrangement, club i receives an a-share of its revenue Ri and an ð1 aÞ=2-share of a lea-
gue revenue pool Ri þ Rj. The after-sharing revenues of club i, denoted by R*i , can be
written as:
R*i ¼ abRi þ ð1 aÞ2 ðbRi þ bRjÞ;
with a 2 ð0; 1. It should be noted that a higher parameter a represents a league with a
lower degree of redistribution. Hence, the case of a ¼ 1 describes a league without
21 Professional team sports leagues often find themselves under antitrust surveillance (Flynn/Gilbert
2001). According to Szymanski (2003), most revenue-sharing arrangements have not been chal-
lenged in the courts because revenue sharing is supposed to enhance competitive balance, and
thus, is in the interest of the consumer.
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revenue-sharing, while the limiting case of a ¼ 0 would characterize a league with equal
revenue sharing.
The maximization problem of club i is thus given by
max
xi0
R*i ðxi; xjÞ ¼ abRiðxi; xjÞ þ ð1 aÞbRjðxi; xjÞ  cxin o: ð15Þ
By solving this maximization problem and analyzing the effect of revenue sharing on the
equilibrium win percentages, we can establish the following proposition.
Proposition 4
In the presence of network externalities, revenue sharing always decreases the compe-
titive balance in the league. Network externalities, however, mitigate the negative effect
of revenue sharing on competitive balance if and only if the market potential ms of the
sponsors is sufficiently small with ms < bms.
Proof. See Appendix A6.
In accordance to other contest models of sports leagues with profit-maximizing clubs
(e. g., Szymanski/Ke´senne 2004; Grossmann et al. 2010), the proposition shows that rev-
enue sharing produces a less balanced competition in a league in which positive network
externalities operate from the fan market to the sponsor market, while negative network
externalities operate from the sponsor market to the fan market. A higher degree of rev-
enue sharing, i. e., a lower parameter a , results in a higher win percentage for the large
club and a lower win percentage for the small club.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. Revenue sharing has a negative effect on
marginal revenue of both clubs in equilibrium. This so-called “dulling effect” is more
pronounced for the underdog (small club) than for the dominant team (large club).
Due to the logit formulation of the CSF, the (positive) marginal impact on the dominant
team’s revenues of a decrease in talent investment by the underdog is greater than the
(positive) marginal impact on the underdog’s revenues of a decrease in talent investment
by the dominant team. As a result, the small club will reduce its investment level rela-
tively more than the large club such that the league becomes less balanced through rev-
enue sharing.
Network externalities, however, can mitigate the negative effect of revenue sharing on
competitive balance. In particular, if the market potential of the sponsors is sufficiently
small such that ms < bms then stronger combined network effects reduce the differences
between clubs in terms of win percentages and thus reduce the negative effect of revenue
sharing on competitive balance. In the opposite case, i. e.,ms > bms, network externalities
even reinforce the dulling effect such that the negative impact of revenue sharing on com-
petitive balance augments.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a contest model of a professional team sports league
with two market sides. The competition of the clubs is the platform between fans on one
market side and sponsors on the other market side. Positive network externalities operate
from the fanmarket to the sponsor market, and ambiguous network externalities operate
from the sponsor market to the fan market.
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In line with the literature on two-sided markets, our analysis shows that a revenue-max-
imizing club has an incentive to keep prices low in the market with relatively stronger
positive network externalities and charge a higher price in a market with relatively weak-
er positive or negative network externalities. In our model, low prices on the fan market
enhance the positive effect on club revenues due to the positive network externalities that
operate from the fan market to the sponsor market. An increase in the demand in the fan
market leads (through positive fan-related network externalities) to an increase in the
demand on the sponsor market. High prices in the market with positive network extern-
alities would inhibit the positive effect on club revenues.
New and potentially important for the sports economics literature, we further derive that
network externalities may crucially affect competitive balance in a sports league. In par-
ticular, we show that stronger combined network effects induce both clubs to increase
their talent investments in equilibrium. If the market potential of the sponsors is suffi-
ciently small, the increase in talent investments of the small club will be stronger than
that of the large club because the small club benefits more from stronger network effects
than the large club. As a result, the win percentage of the small club increases and the win
percentage of the large club decreases in equilibrium, yielding a more balanced league.
With the introduction of a revenue sharing arrangement, our model shows that network
externalities can mitigate the negative effect of revenue sharing on competitive balance.
We conclude that it is important to incorporate network externalities into the analysis of
team sports leagues. Depending on the market potential of the sponsors, theoretical ana-
lyses of sports leagues that do not take network externalities into account may under- or
overestimate the actual level of competitive balance in a league. For instance, theoretical
models without network externalities may suggest the implementation of measures to
increase competitive balance, which may not be necessary because the league may al-
ready be optimally balanced.22 Finally, our model suggests that both types of clubs ben-
efit from the presence of network externalities because club profits always increase with
stronger combined network effects. This result holds true even though costs increase for
both types of clubs due to higher talent investments. The higher club revenues, however,
compensate for the higher costs, such that club profits always increase.
Our model may serve as a basic framework for the analysis of network effects in team
sports leagues. There is a broad range of further applications and model extensions. For
instance, it could be potentially fruitful to model the competition between the clubs not
only on the pitch but also to attract fans and/or sponsors. In our current setting, the two
clubs are essentially monopolistic platforms because each platform attracts fans and
sponsors from different subsets. It would be interesting to see whether our results carry
over to a setting with competing platforms. Another promising avenue for further re-
search would be the extension of our model in order to conduct a welfare analysis in
the framework of a sports league with network externalities.23 Even though the relevance
of competitive balance is intuitively plausible, an exclusive focus on competitive balance
would only be justified if the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis completely holds. If, on
the other hand, social welfare does not monotonically increase as competitive balance
increases, an exclusive focus on competitive balance would result in inefficient policy
22 See Fort and Quirk (2011), who analyze the optimal degree of competitive balance in a season ticket
sports league.
23 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for these two suggestions.
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conclusions.24 Finally, we encourage to introduce restrictions on player salaries (caps
and floors) into our model. Payroll restrictions to improve competitive balance and
control costs are common in professional team sports leagues all around the world.
The implementation of such payroll restrictions in the model with network externalities
could yield further implications for the governance of team sports leagues.
Appendix
A1 Proof of Lemma 1
In stage 2, club i maximizes its revenue Ri ¼ pfi qfi þ psi qsi , by taking the investment
decisions made in stage 1 as given. Formally, club i solves the following maximization
problem:25
max
ðqf
i
;qs
i
Þ0
Ri ¼ pfi qfi þ psi qsi ¼ ðmfi  qfi þ nsqsi Þqfi þ ðms  qsi þ nf qfi Þqsi
h i
hi: ð16Þ
The reaction functions of fans and sponsors are derived as
qfi q
s
i
	 
 ¼ 1
2
mfi þ ðnf þ nsÞqsi
 
and qsi q
f
i
 
¼ 1
2
ms þ ðnf þ nsÞqfi
 
:
Note that there is a positive relationship between the quantities demanded by sponsors
and fans in equilibrium if the combined network effects are positive, i. e., nf þ ns > 0.
Solving this system of reaction functions, yields the following equilibrium quantities for
club i
bqfi ¼ 2mfi þmsg2 gð Þ 2þ gð Þ and bqsi ¼ m
f
i gþ 2ms
2 gð Þ 2þ gð Þ :
Substitution into prices pfi ¼ mfi  bqfi þ nsbqsi hi and psi ¼ ms  bqsi þ nfbqfi hi yields
bpfi ¼ mfi 2 nfg	 
þmsðns  nf Þ2 gð Þ 2þ gð Þ hi and bpsi ¼ m
f
i ðnf  nsÞ þms 2 nsgð Þ
2 gð Þ 2þ gð Þ hi:
This completes the proof of the lemma.
A2 Proof of Lemma 2
(i) To show that equilibrium quantities ðbqfi ; bqsi Þ for fans and sponsors of club i increase
(decrease) with stronger fan (sponsor) network effects, we compute
24 Apart of the problems of proxying competitive balance, the empirical evidence on the effects of
competitive balance onto demand remains ambiguous (Downward/Dawson 2000 and Szymanski
2003).
25 In our setting it is an equivalent approach if clubs first maximize revenues with respect to quantities
and then derive equilibrium prices or vice versa.
352 . Helmut Dietl, Tobias Duschl, Egon Franck, and Markus Lang
qbqfi
qnf
¼ qbqfi
qns
¼ 4m
f
i gþmsð4þ g2Þ
2 gð Þ 2þ gð Þ½ 2 > 0 and
qbqsi
qnf
¼ qbqsi
qns
¼ 4m
sgþmfi ð4þ g2Þ
2 gð Þ 2þ gð Þ½ 2 > 0;
for mfi > 0, m
s > 0, 1 > nf  nsj j  0 and g 2 ½0; 2Þ.
(ii) To show that, given a certain quality of the competition hi, equilibrium prices bpfi for
fans (bpsi for sponsors) of club i decrease (increase) with stronger fan-related network
effects, we compute
qbpfi
qnf
¼ m
f
i 4n
f  nsg2	 
þms 4þ gðnf  3nsÞ 
2 gð Þ 2þ gð Þ½ 2 < 0;
qbpsi
qnf
¼ m
s 4nf  nsg2	 
þmfi 4þ gðnf  3nsÞ 
2 gð Þ 2þ gð Þ½ 2 > 0;
for mfi > 0, m
s > 0, 1 > nf  nsj j  0 and g 2 ½0; 2Þ.
To show that, given a certain quality of the competition hi, equilibrium prices bpfi for fans
(bpsi for sponsors) of club i increase (decrease) with stronger sponsor-related network ef-
fects, we compute
qbpfi
qns
¼ m
f
i 4n
s  nf g2	 
þmsi 4þ gðns  3nf Þ 
2 gð Þ 2þ gð Þ½ 2 > 0;
qbpsi
qns
¼ m
s 4ns  nf g2	 
þmfi 4þ gðns  3nf Þ 
2 gð Þ 2þ gð Þ½ 2 < 0;
for mfi 2 ½m
sð4nsnf g2Þ
gð3nfnsÞ4 ;
msð4þgð3nfnsÞÞ
nf g24ns ; ms > 0, 1 > nf  nsj j  0 and g 2 ½0;2Þ. This com-
pletes the proof of the lemma.
A3 Proof of Proposition 1
To prove that stronger combined network effects induce the large (small) club to decrease
(increase) its win percentage in equilibrium if and only if the market potential of the
sponsors is sufficiently small, we proceed as follows. We write qjiðgÞqg ¼ j0iðgÞ. According
to Lemma 3, we know that j1ðgÞ > j2ðgÞ and j01ðgÞ > j02ðgÞ > 0. Thus, we computebw1=bw2 ¼ j1ðgÞ= j1ðgÞj2ðgÞ½ 1=2> 1. Now, we will show that qðbw1=bw2Þqg < 0 and thus
qbw1
qg < 0 and
qbw2
qg > 0:
qðbw1=bw2Þ
qg
¼ j1ðgÞ j
0
1ðgÞj2ðgÞ  j1ðgÞj02ðgÞ
 
2 j1ðgÞj2ðgÞ½ 3=2
< 0, j1ðgÞ
j2ðgÞ >
j01ðgÞ
j02ðgÞ
:
With jiðgÞgiven by (11), it holds
j1ðgÞ
j2ðgÞ ¼
ðmf1Þ2 þ msð Þ2þmf1msg
ðmf2Þ2 þ msð Þ2þmf2msg
and
j01ðgÞ
j02ðgÞ
¼
mf1gþ 2ms
 
2mf1 þmsg
 
mf2gþ 2ms
 
2mf2 þmsg
  :
We conclude that j1ðgÞj2ðgÞ >
j0
1
ðgÞ
j0
2
ðgÞ , ms < bms. This completes the proof of the proposition.
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A4 Proof of Proposition 2
To prove that stronger combined network effects increase profits of the large and small
club, we write the equilibrium profits of club i as a function of g with
bpiðgÞ ¼ jiðgÞ2 3jjðgÞ jiðgÞjjðgÞ
 1=2þjiðgÞ 2jjðgÞ þ jiðgÞjjðgÞ 1=2 h i
ðjiðgÞ  jjðgÞÞ jiðgÞ þ jiðgÞjjðgÞ
 1=2 
jjðgÞ þ jiðgÞjjðgÞ
 1=2 
and compute the partial derivative with respect to the combined network effects g as
qbpiðgÞ
qg
¼
jiðgÞ 4 jiðgÞjjðgÞ
 1=2
j0iðgÞ þ jiðgÞ þ 6jjðgÞ
 
j0iðgÞ  3jiðgÞj0jðgÞ
h i
jiðgÞ þ jjðgÞ þ 2 jiðgÞjjðgÞ
 1=2 2 :
To prove that qbpiqg > 0, it suffices to show that jiðgÞ þ 6jjðgÞ j0iðgÞ  3jiðgÞj0jðgÞ > 0 be-
cause then the numerator is positive.26 We derive
jiðgÞ þ 6jjðgÞ
 
j0iðgÞ > 3jiðgÞj0jðgÞ ,
jiðgÞ þ 6jjðgÞ
3jiðgÞ >
j0jðgÞ
j0iðgÞ
ð17Þ
With jiðgÞ given by (11), this inequality translates for club 1 into
a1ðgÞ 	 m
f
1ðmf1 þmsgÞ þ 6mf2ðmf2 þmsgÞ þ 7ms
3 mf1ðmf1 þmsgÞ þ ðmsÞ2
h i > ð2ms þmf2gÞð2mf2 þmsgÞ
ð2ms þmf1gÞð2mf1 þmsgÞ
	 b1ðgÞ
ð18Þ
and for club 2 into
a2ðgÞ 	 6m
f
1ðmf1 þmsgÞ þmf2ðmf2 þmsgÞ þ 7ms
3 mf2ðmf2 þmsgÞ þ ðmsÞ2
h i > ð2ms þmf1gÞð2mf1 þmsgÞ
ð2ms þmf2gÞð2mf2 þmsgÞ
	 b2ðgÞ
ð19Þ
Next, we derive the following properties of aiðgÞ and biðgÞ with i 2 f1; 2g:
aiðgÞ 2 C1 and biðgÞ 2 C1 ð20Þ
qa1ðgÞ
qg
> 0, mf1mf2 > ðmsÞ2;
qb1ðgÞ
qg
> 0, mf1mf2 < ðmsÞ2 and ð21Þ
qa2ðgÞ
qg
> 0, mf1mf2 < ðmsÞ2;
qb2ðgÞ
qg
> 0, mf1mf2 > ðmsÞ2
a1ð0Þ ¼ 7
3
 2ðm
f
1 mf2Þðmf1 þmf2Þ
ðmf1Þ2 þ ðmsÞ2
>
mf2
mf1
¼ b1ð0Þ and ð22Þ
26 Note that the numerator would be positive for a less restrictive condition.
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lim
g!2
a1ðgÞ ¼ m
f
1ðmf1 þ 2msÞ þ 6mf2ðmf2 þ 2msÞ þ 7ms
3ðmf2 þmsÞ2
>
ðms þmf1Þ2
ðms þmf2Þ2
¼ lim
g!2
b1ðgÞ
a2ð0Þ ¼ 7
3
 2ðm
f
2 mf1Þðmf1 þmf2Þ
ðmf1Þ2 þ ðmsÞ2
>
mf1
mf2
¼ b2ð0Þ and ð23Þ
lim
g!2
a2ðgÞ ¼ 6m
f
1ðmf1 þ 2msÞ þmf2ðmf2 þ 2msÞ þ 7ms
3ðmf1 þmsÞ2
>
ðms þmf2Þ2
ðms þmf1Þ2
¼ lim
g!2
b2ðgÞ
From (20), (21), (22), and (23) we derive that inequalities (18) and (19) are satisfied
for all mfi > 0, m
s > 0, 1 > nf  nsj j  0 and g 2 ½0; 2Þ. It follows that inequality (17)
is satisfied such that club profits are increasing with stronger combined network effects.
This completes the proof of the proposition.
A5 Proof of Proposition 3
To prove that a larger market potential ms of the sponsors increases the competitive ba-
lance in the league, we proceed as follows. We consider jiðmsÞ ¼ ðm
f
i
Þ2þ msð Þ2þmf
i
msg
2gð Þ 2þgð Þ as a
function of ms and write qjiðm
sÞ
qms ¼ j0iðmsÞ. We derive the following properties:
j1ðmsÞ  j2ðmsÞ ¼
mf1 mf2
 
mf1 þmf2 þmsg
 
2 gð Þ 2þ gð Þ > 0;
j0iðmsÞ ¼
mfi gþ 2ms
2 gð Þ 2þ gð Þ > 0; and j
0
1ðmsÞ > j02ðmsÞ
for all mf1 > m
f
2 > 0;m
s > 0 and g 2 ½0;2Þ. We know that competitive balance can be
expressed in terms of jiðmsÞ as bw1bw2 ¼ j1ðmsÞj1ðmsÞj2ðmsÞ½ 1=2 > 1. Now, we will show that
qðbw1=bw2Þ
qms < 0 and thus
qbw1
qms< 0 and
qbw2
qms > 0 :
qðbw1=bw2Þ
qms
¼ j1ðm
sÞ j01ðmsÞj2ðmsÞ  j1ðmsÞj02ðmsÞ
 
2 j1ðmsÞj2ðmsÞ½ 3=2
< 0, j1ðm
sÞ
j2ðmsÞ >
j01ðmsÞ
j02ðmsÞ
We derive
j1ðmsÞ
j2ðmsÞ ¼
ðmf1Þ2 þ msð Þ2þmf1msg
ðmf2Þ2 þ msð Þ2þmf2msg
and
j01ðmsÞ
j02ðmsÞ
¼ m
f
1gþ 2ms
mf2gþ 2ms
and can show that j1ðm
sÞ
j2ðmsÞ >
j0
1
ðmsÞ
j0
2
ðmsÞ holds for all m
s > 0. We conclude that competitive
balance increases with a larger market potential of the sponsors, i. e., qðbw1=bw2Þqms < 0.
This completes the proof of the proposition.
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A6 Proof of Proposition 4
The first-order conditions of the maximization problem (15) are derived as
qR*i
qxi
¼ a q
bRi
qwi
qwi
qxi
þ 1 a
2
qbRi
qwi
qwi
qxi
þ q
bRj
qwj
qwj
qxi
 !
 c ¼ 0:
It is easy to verify that the second-order conditions for a maximum are satisfied. By com-
bining the first-order conditions of club i and j, and using the adding-up constraint
qwi
qxi
¼  qwjqxi , we obtain
a
qbRi
qwi
 1 a
2
qbRj
qwj
 q
bRi
qwi
 !" #
qwi
qxi
¼ a q
bRj
qwj
 1 a
2
qbRi
qwi
 q
bRj
qwj
 !" #
qwj
qxj
:
By using (3) and (10), and after some rearrangements, we find that in equilibrium ðbx*1;bx*2Þ
it must hold
bx*1 ¼ ð1 aÞðj1  j2Þ þ ð1 aÞ2ðj21 þ j22Þ þ 2j1j2ð1þ að6þ aÞ
h i1=2
2ð1þ aÞj2 bx*2;
with ji; i 2 f1; 2g given by (11). It follows that the equilibrium win percentage of club i
is given by
bw*i ¼ jið1þ 3aÞ þ jjð1 aÞ  ð1 aÞ2ðj21 þ j22Þ þ 2j1j2ð1þ að6þ aÞ
h i1=2
4aðji  jjÞ :
We further compute the partial derivative of bw*1 with respect to a at a ¼ 1 as
qbw*
1
qa

a¼1
¼  j1þj22
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
j1j2
p
4ðj1j2Þ < 0, because j1 > j2. We conclude that a higher degree of rev-
enue sharing (i. e., a lower a) increases the win percentage of the large club 1 and con-
sequently decreases the win percentage of the small club 2. As a result, competitive ba-
lance decreases which proves part (i) of the proposition.
To prove part (ii), we proceed as follows. We define FðgÞ as the partial derivative of bw*1
with respect to a at a ¼ 1, i. e., FðgÞ :¼ j1ðgÞþj2ðgÞ2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
j1ðgÞj2ðgÞ
p
4ðj1ðgÞj2ðgÞÞ , and we show
F0ðgÞ ¼ j1ðgÞ þ j2ðgÞ  2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
j1ðgÞj2ðgÞ
p 
j1ðgÞj02ðgÞ  j01ðgÞj2ðgÞ
 
4
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
j1ðgÞj2ðgÞ
p
j1ðgÞ  j2ðgÞ½ 2
> 0, j1ðgÞ
j2ðgÞ >
j01ðgÞ
j02ðgÞ
As we know from the proof of Proposition 1, the last inequality is satisfied if and only
if ms < bms. We conclude that stronger combined network effects gmitigate the negative
effect of revenue sharing on competitive balance if and only if ms < bms. Note that
numerical simulations have shown that parts (i) and (ii) of the proposition hold for
all parameters a 2 ð0; 1.
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